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As personnel costs in the military spiral higher and higher, so does the level of 
scrutiny of military bonus programs. Each service and each community is faced with the 
challenge of retaining the quantity and quality of personnel it needs while not breaking 
faith with a force that has endured longer deployments, increased operational tempo 
(OPTEMPO), and a state of perpetual war since 2001. The services also value an 
egalitarian pay structure and must be ever vigilant of good order and discipline and 
morale. The current system is cumbersome and inefficient, offering the same bonus to 
both high performers and low performers within categories of Pilot/Naval Flight Officer 
(NFO) and Type/Model/Series (T/M/S). The primary alternative that has been offered is 
an auction system. However, each version of the auction method has distinct drawbacks 
and implementation challenges.  
In this paper, I propose a menu-of-contracts system whereby aviators can choose 
between a plan that offers guaranteed payouts at a medium rate or a plan that offers low 
payouts initially and then high payouts when certain performance milestones are met. 
This will induce aviators to self-select according to their own ability levels and 
effectively targets high performers with high bonus levels while maintaining a sense of 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. CONTEXT ..................................................................................................1 
B. STUDY SUMMARY ..................................................................................2 
C. STUDY ORGANIZATION .......................................................................2 
II. BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................5 
A. AVIATOR CAREER PROGRESSION ...................................................5 
1. Flight Training ...............................................................................5 
2. First Sea Tour .................................................................................8 
3. First Shore Tour .............................................................................8 
4. Disassociated Sea Tour ..................................................................9 
5. Second Shore Tour .........................................................................9 
6. Department Head Tour .................................................................9 
B. NON-BONUS AVIATOR COMPENSATION ......................................10 
1. Base Pay ........................................................................................11 
2. Housing Allowance.......................................................................12 
3. Sustenance Allowance ..................................................................12 
4. Other Allowances .........................................................................12 
5. Tax Exemption .............................................................................13 
6. Retirement ....................................................................................13 
7. Military Services ..........................................................................14 
8. Civilian-Offered Discounts ..........................................................15 
9. Fly Pay...........................................................................................15 
C. CURRENT ACCP STRUCTURE ..........................................................16 
1. Aviation Department Head Retention Bonus ............................16 
2. Aviation Command Retention Bonus (ACRB) .........................19 
D. HISTORY OF THE ACCP .....................................................................19 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................23 
A. ACADEMIC LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................23 
1. Market Signaling ..........................................................................23 
2. Menu of Contracts .......................................................................24 
3. Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection ........................................25 
B. RELATED MILITARY STUDIES ........................................................27 
1. Assessing Officer Quality ............................................................27 
2. Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay ..............................29 
3. AF Pilot Retention........................................................................30 
 viii 
4. Navy Aviation Bonus as an Auction System ..............................32 
IV. PROBLEMS FACING AVIATOR RETENTION ...........................................35 
V. MENU OF CONTRACTS ...................................................................................39 
A. PROPOSED BONUS PLAN ...................................................................39 
B. PLAN BREAKDOWN.............................................................................40 
1. Early Selection of Bonus Option .................................................41 
2. Six-Year Mark ..............................................................................41 
3. Stopping Payment after DH Tour ..............................................42 
4. Continuous Offer versus One-Time Offer .................................43 
5. Payment Pause for One-Time FOS ............................................43 
C. EXPECTED EFFECTS ...........................................................................44 
1. Increased Retention of Highest Quality Aviators .....................44 
2. Increased Bonus Efficiency .........................................................44 
3. Lower Payouts to Low Performers ............................................46 
4. Increased Motivation and Effort ................................................47 
5. Maintenance of Equity ................................................................47 
D. POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS ...............................................................48 
1. Imperfect Promotion System ......................................................48 
2. Not Targeting Undecided Bonus Takers....................................48 
3. Reinforcing “Golden Path” .........................................................49 
4. Earlier Payment for Pilots ...........................................................50 
5. Earlier ADSO for ACRB Takers ................................................50 
VI. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION.......................51 
A. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................51 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................51 
C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................52 
APPENDIX .......................................................................................................................53 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................57 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1.  Pilot Training Progression. Source: “Naval Aviator Training” 
(2017). ..........................................................................................................7 
Figure 2.  NFO Training Progression. Source: “Naval Aviator Training” 
(2017). ..........................................................................................................7 
Figure 3.  Aviation Officer Career Progression. Source: “FY18 Community 
Brief” (n.d.). ...............................................................................................10 
Figure 4.  Possible Bonus Outcomes ..........................................................................45 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1.  2017 Officer Monthly Base Pay. Source: “Military Pay Charts—
1949 to 2017” (2017) .................................................................................11 
Table 2.  ACIP Pay Chart. Source: 37 U.S. Code § 301a. ........................................15 
Table 3.  ADHRB Total Amounts 2009–2017. ........................................................18 
Table 4.  Uniform-Price Auction Example. Source: Kelso (2014). ..........................53 
Table 5.  QUAD Auction Example. Source: Kelso (2014). ......................................54 
Table 6.  CRAM Auction Example. Source: Kelso (2014). .....................................55 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACCP Aviation Career Continuation Pay 
ACIP Aviation Career Incentive Pay 
ACP Aviation Continuation Pay 
ACRB Aviation Command Retention Bonus 
ADHRB Aviation Department Head Retention Bonus 
ADSO Active Duty Service Obligation 
AP Aviator Pay 
API Aviation Preflight Indoctrination 
ARP Aviator Retention Pay 
BAH Basic Allowance for Housing 
BAS Basic Allowance for Sustenance 
CDR commander 
CO Commanding Officer 
CRAM Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism 
DH Department Head 
DOD Department of Defense 
DON Department of the Navy 
DRM Dynamic Retention Model 
EP Early Promote 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FITREP fitness report 
FOS failure of selection 
FRG Fleet Replenishment Group 
FRS Fleet Replenishment Squadron 
IFS Initial Flight Screening 
JO junior officer 
LCDR lieutenant commander 
LORIO Level of Officer Retention Inventory Optimizer 
LT lieutenant 
MTA Member Trait Average 
 xiv
MWR Morale Welfare and Recreaction 
NATOPS Naval Air Training Operation Procedures Standardization 
NFO Naval Flight Officer 
NMI non-monetary incentive 
NROTC Navy Reserve Officer’s Training Corps 
OHA Overseas Housing Allowance 
OPTEMPO operational tempo  
PEP Pilot Exchange Program 
QUAD Quality-Adjusted Discount 
RAND Research and Development 
RSCUMAVG reporting senior’s cumulative average 
SCRA Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 
SNA Student Naval Aviator 
SNFO Student Naval Flight Officer 
SWO Surface Warfare Officer 
SWOCP Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay 
T/M/S type/model/series 
TSP Thrift Savings Plan 




I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Chong Wang, for your continued 
support, guidance, and insight through both “Plan A” and “Plan B” of this thesis. Your 
feedback was invaluable. I would also like to thank my parents, Sherrie and David, for 
always picking up the phone when I called needing a break from writing. I would like to 
thank my mother in particular, for lending me her professional expertise as an editor. She 
even gave me a 10% discount. 
 
 xvi




The ideal retention bonus for the Navy aviation community retains aviators of the 
highest quality and in the right quantity while also motivating officers to perform at their 
best. It does this within the constraints of minimizing costs, maintaining morale and good 
order and discipline, while conforming to an often-rigid Navy promotion and 
advancement system. I contend that a menu-of-contracts system meets these criteria and 
offer it as an alternative to both the current system and the proposed auction systems. 
A. CONTEXT 
Across the military, personnel costs are spiraling higher and higher. Senior 
leaders’ attempts to cope with the situation have sparked the kind of emotionally charged 
debate that draws media interest. Reducing personnel costs is a strategic necessity, yet 
leaders do not want to break faith with military personnel who have endured longer 
deployments, increased OPTEMPO, and a state of perpetual war since 2001. Moreover, 
the political consequences of voting to reduce military pay can be substantial for any 
elected official. As the Navy, as well as the military in general, attempts to manage these 
fiscal challenges, it is also faced with a pilot shortage that only promises to worsen as 
commercial airlines increase hiring substantially. Furthermore, with the new Navy 
retirement system coming online, there is decreased incentive for military personnel to 
remain on active duty until reaching 20 years of service. This will make short-term 
incentive bonuses all the more important for the Navy to retain the people it needs. 
This environment has brought to the forefront the need to develop an incentive 
system for aviators that is able to retain the quality and quantity of aviators the Navy 
needs while keeping costs to a minimum. Under the current system, the Aviation Career 
Continuation Pay (ACCP) pays a bonus to aviators who agree to sign on for a 
Department Head tour. The amount of the bonus depends on whether an aviator is a pilot 
or Naval Flight Officer (NFO) and what type of aircraft he or she flies. The primary 
alternative that has been offered to this system is an auction mechanism whereby aviators 
bid on the amount of bonus they are willing to accept in order to stay in aviation. Those 
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who pick the lowest amount will be retained and promoted. Neither the current system 
nor the proposed alternative sufficiently takes into account the quality of the aviator.  
B. STUDY SUMMARY 
In this paper I will make the case for a “menu-of-contracts” bonus system and lay 
out the details of how such a plan could be implemented into the current Navy promotion 
and advancement system. The menu-of-contracts will effectively target higher bonuses to 
the best aviators, ensuring the retention of the quality of aviator the service needs. 
Aviators will be able to choose between a bonus that pays out at a guaranteed rate and 
one that pays out at a lower rate initially but at a higher rate once certain performance 
milestones are met. This will induce aviators to select the bonus that maximizes their own 
gain and thereby achieves a perfect separating equilibrium according to ability level. 
Separating individuals by performance as such will increase the efficiency with which we 
offer the bonus. It will prevent the Navy from offering too much bonus to low performers 
who will stay in anyway and too little bonus to keep the high performers the Navy wants 
and needs. This system will also combat any perception that the Navy is breaking faith 
with its aviators as the individual will be able to choose their own bonus. Other benefits 
will include higher quality senior leadership, which will in turn help retention. The 
superior efficiency of this system will retain both higher quality and a greater quantity of 
aviators. 
I compare this menu-of-contracts system to the proposed auction systems and 
identify shortcomings in implementation of the auction system. The menu-of-contracts 
system more closely achieves the goals of the retention bonus while fitting within the 
current promotion and advancement system. 
C. STUDY ORGANIZATION 
The study is separated into six chapters that will support the change to the bonus 
system that I propose. The first chapter after the introduction will provide the context in 
which the new system must be considered. It will outline the current expected career path 
of a naval aviator, as well as other compensation that an aviator receives in addition to 
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the bonus. It then explains the current bonus system and how that system has evolved 
over the years. 
The next chapter is a review of all relevant literature that has contributed to the 
development of this proposed system. This includes economic and contract theory as well 
as a review of similar bonus programs in the Surface Warfare community and the Air 
Force aviation community. It will also discuss the auction system that has been offered as 
an alternative to the current bonus system. 
Chapter IV outlines the specific challenges facing the aviation community and the 
goals that the aviation bonus system seeks to accomplish. Chapter V provides the details 
of how this proposed bonus system could be applied to the aviation community and its 
expected effects including some potential drawbacks. Finally, Chapter VI presents a final 
summary, conclusion, and recommendations. 
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In order to develop a more effective bonus system, it is important to first 
understand what the current system is and what led us to that system. This chapter 
discusses how the bonus fits into the expected aviator career progression, how aviators 
are currently compensated outside of the bonus, how the current bonus system works, and 
what led us to this bonus system. 
A. AVIATOR CAREER PROGRESSION 
The context in which ACCP bonus is administered is extremely important in 
understanding how to improve it. Therefore, we must understand the basic outline of an 
aviator’s career. Given the long time needed for training and long service obligation 
incurred by pilots and Naval Flight Officers (NFO), the aviation community has a more 
uniform career progression than most communities. The first several tours are usually of 
the same type for all aviators. This section details the expected career progression of a 
Naval Aviator and the milestones he or she is expected to achieve in order to advance. 
1. Flight Training 
The Navy’s flight training begins with all aviators completing the same training, 
then slowly separates pilots and NFOs and divides each group into specific platforms to 
focus on their own training. This process means that different timelines are required to 
earn the aviator’s “wings of gold,” as well as different timelines until an aviator arrives at 
an operational squadron. 
a. Initial Flight Screening 
The very first phase of flight training is designed to reduce attrition in further 
phases of flight training by identifying the Student Naval Aviators (SNAs) and Student 
Naval Flight Officers (SNFOs) who lack the determination, motivation, or aeronautical 
adaptability required to succeed (Department of the Navy [DON], 2012). This phase also 
is intended to introduce current and potential SNAs and SNFOs to the basics of flight 
training. The program sends students to civilian private pilot programs to get the very 
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basics of flying in 13.5–15 hours of flight (DON, 2012). Midshipmen at the Naval 
Academy are able start this program before they are commissioned, thus shortening the 
time to train after commissioning. 
b. Aviation Pre-flight Indoctrination 
This is the last phase of flight training that pilots and NFOs complete together. It 
is a ground-based school that teaches students the basics of aerodynamics, weather, 
engines, navigation, and flight rules and regulations. Students also complete water and 
land survival training, parachute training, and flight gear familiarization (Naval Aviation 
Schools Command [NASC], 2017).  
c. Primary Flight Training 
For primary flight training, SNAs and SNFOs are separated but complete much of 
the same training. Both are trained in basic flight maneuvers, aerobatics, and instrument 
navigation. SNAs are also trained in formation flying. This program lasts for 
approximately 12 weeks for SNFOs and 24 for SNAs (Kelso, 2014). Following this 
school, students may select which community they wish to join. Quotas are set by the 
Navy, however, and it has the final say regarding which community each student will be 
assigned to. 
d. Further Flight Training 
After primary flight training, each community breaks into its own specific training 
pipeline, as depicted in Figures 1 and 2.  
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Figure 1.  Pilot Training Progression. 
Source: “Naval Aviator Training” (2017). 
 
 
Figure 2.  NFO Training Progression. 
Source: “Naval Aviator Training” (2017). 
Generally, NFOs take about 12–18 months to be winged, and pilots about 18–24 
months (Kelso, 2014). Winging is the point at which a SNFO or SNA becomes a fully 
qualified NFO or pilot. It is also the point at which an officer’s service obligation begins. 
Currently, pilots owe eight years from this point, and NFOs owe six.  
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e. Fleet Replacement Squadron 
After winging, pilots and NFOs still have more training before reporting to their 
first operational squadron. They are assigned to their Fleet Replenishment Squadron 
(FRS) for final training on the specific aircraft they will fly. This can take an additional 
six months to a year, depending on the platform (Kelso, 2014).  
2. First Sea Tour 
 Prior to the first sea tour, an aviator has received only “non-observed” fitness 
reports (FITREPs). Non-observed FITREPs do not count for or against an officer’s 
promotion. Officers arrive at their first squadron with essentially a blank slate in terms of 
evaluations. Performing well in this first tour in an operational squadron is essential to an 
aviator’s career success. Success in the first tour will position them well for a competitive 
job in their second tour, which can lead to another one in their third tour. The focus in 
this tour is on attaining plane-specific tactical qualifications. A desirable qualification is 
that of instructor pilot or instructor NFO. Additionally, certain ground jobs within the 
squadron, such as Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization 
(NATOPS) officer or Safety officer, are generally given to high performing officers. 
These positions can be a signal beyond FITREPs of whether an officer is expected to 
succeed.  
3. First Shore Tour 
Taking orders in which an officer can compete with many other officers as a first 
shore tour is essential to an aviator’s advancement. The most desirable orders for those 
wishing to advance in naval aviation are “production” billets, which are defined as those 
contributing to the support and manning of the community (Chief of Naval Personnel 
[CNP], 2013). These can include returning to the FRS as an instructor or participating in 
the test pilot program. As these billets are limited and are the best way to remain 
competitive for promotion, there is a screening process in place to ensure that the best 
officers are selected to these jobs.  
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Other jobs less likely to help an officer advance include participating in the Pilot 
Exchange Program (PEP) and flying with an allied nation’s military for a tour, being 
company officer at the Naval Academy or a Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps 
(NROTC) instructor, or working on a staff. Even getting an advanced degree at an 
institution like the Naval Postgraduate School, something that one would think would 
make an officer more valuable, is seen to have an adverse effect on an officer’s chances 
of promotion. 
4. Disassociated Sea Tour 
This tour, like the first shore tour, has job opportunities that enhance an officer’s 
chances of advancement and ones that detract from it. Like the previous tour, the job to 
which an officer is slated depends largely on the individual’s prior performance. Each 
community has its own jobs that it values in this tour. Often VP and Helo aviators will go 
to a job on an aircraft carrier. Even on the carrier, though, there are jobs that will look 
good to a promotion board and those that will be viewed more negatively. Other 
communities prefer their officers go to a carrier air wing staff, or do a “super JO” tour in 
which they go back to an operational squadron. 
5. Second Shore Tour 
Not all aviators will have a second shore tour. Because of the various times 
between commissioning and arriving at their first squadron, some officers do not have 
time for this tour before a Department Head tour. For the same reason, the length of this 
tour is quite variable and is often used as a holding point for officers until they can screen 
for O4 and Department Head. If they do screen for these positions, this tour can be cut 
short in order to get the officer to their Department Head tour. 
6. Department Head Tour 
Prior to a Department Head tour, aviators will return to the FRS to requalify if 
they have not been in a flying billet. They will then complete 30-month orders in a 
squadron as a Department Head. As Kelso points out, while in their first tour an aviator’s 
proficiency was measured by the qualifications they received and their performance in 
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the aircraft; by a Department Head tour, an aviator is expected to already be proficient in 
his or her job in the aircraft. The factor that decides whether or not a Department Head 
receives a favorable FITREP lies in the officer’s ability to manage the personnel below 
them and the squadron as a whole.  
 
Figure 3.  Aviation Officer Career Progression. 
Source: “FY18 Community Brief” (n.d.). 
B. NON-BONUS AVIATOR COMPENSATION 
Popular media often refers to how little money the military makes and will cite 
the base pay tables, which are readily available online. This is usually done while making 
some point about how the military bears so much sacrifice for such little compensation. 
The truth, however, is that base pay is just a fraction of the total compensation that 
service members receive. The host of bonuses, allowances, and special pays make base 
pay sometimes only half of a service member’s paycheck. In addition, there are more 
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intangible benefits that are not included in a member’s paycheck. To appreciate the 
impact a bonus will have on a service member, we must understand the total 
compensation package those service members are receiving without the bonus. 
1. Base Pay 
Military base pay is consistent across all services and is rank and time-in-service 
dependent. The military pay scales are readily available to all via a simple Internet 
search. Table 1 depicts the officer pay scales for 2017 showing monthly pay. 
Table 1.   2017 Officer Monthly Base Pay. Source: 
“Military Pay Charts—1949 to 2017” (2017). 
 
 
<2 >2 >3 >4 >6 >8 >10 >12 >14
O-10
O-9
O-8 10,155 10,488 10,709 10,770 11,046 11,506 11,613 12,050 12,175
O-7 8,438 8,830 9,011 9,156 9,417 9,675 9,973 10,270 10,569
O-6 6,399 7,030 7,491 7,491 7,520 7,842 7,885 7,885 8,333
O-5 5,334 6,009 6,425 6,503 6,763 6,918 7,260 7,511 7,834
O-4 4,603 5,328 5,684 5,762 6,092 6,446 6,887 7,230 7,469
O-3 4,047 4,587 4,951 5,398 5,657 5,941 6,124 6,426 6,584
O-2 3,497 3,982 4,586 4,741 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839
O-1 3,035 3,159 3,819 3,819 3,819 3,819 3,819 3,819 3,819
<16 >18 >20 >22 >24 >26 >28 >30 >32
O-10 15,583 15,583 15,583 15,583 15,583 15,583 15,583
O-9 14,352 14,559 14,858 15,379 15,379 15,583 15,583
O-8 12,552 13,097 13,599 13,934 13,934 13,934 13,934 14,283 14,283
O-7 11,506 12,297 12,297 12,297 12,297 12,360 12,360 12,607 12,607
O-6 9,125 9,590 10,055 10,319 10,587 11,106 11,106 11,328 11,328
O-5 8,330 8,565 8,798 9,063 9,063 9,063 9,063 9,063 9,063
O-4 7,606 7,685 7,685 7,685 7,685 7,685 7,685 7,685 7,685
O-3 6,584 6,584 6,584 6,584 6,584 6,584 6,584 6,584 6,584
O-2 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839 4,839






2. Housing Allowance 
Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) is usually the bulk of a service member’s 
non-base pay monthly compensation. The purpose of BAH is to provide service members 
funds with which to find housing in the area of their duty station. As such, service 
members living in base housing, in the barracks, or on the ship, are not eligible to receive 
BAH. The amount of BAH depends on several factors. The primary factor is the cost of 
living. Service members receive more allowance if the cost of living is high in the area of 
their duty station. It is also rank dependent, with higher ranks receiving more allowance. 
Finally, a service member receives either the “with dependent” rate or “without 
dependent” rate but the Navy does not distinguish between number of dependents. So a 
married service member with no children will receive the same as a married service 
member with five children.  
A service member living overseas will not receive BAH, but instead will get an 
overseas housing allowance (OHA). OHA is also rank, family, and location dependent 
but the primary difference is that OHA is “use it or lose it.” This means that if a service 
member does not use the full amount of the OHA on housing, then the remainder is 
recouped by the Navy.  
3. Sustenance Allowance 
Service members receive a monthly basic allowance for sustenance (BAS) to be 
used for food. This allowance, like BAH, is location dependent. Unlike BAH, however, 
BAS is the same across all ranks and dependent situation.  
4. Other Allowances 
There are a number of other allowances that an officer may be paid at any given 
time depending on their duty and current situation. These include, but are not limited to, 
hazardous duty pay, imminent danger pay, flight deck pay, and family separation pay 
(“Special and Incentive Pays,” 2014). These allowances are paid to officers and enlisted 
personnel based on where they are currently stationed or deployed and their required 
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duties. Payments stop when the service member exits the area or ceases the activity that 
prompted the allowance. 
5. Tax Exemption 
Service members receive a multitude of tax exemptions that add up to a significant 
amount of savings. Many of the allowances and bonuses that aviators receive are not 
taxable. Since these add-ons make up such a large portion of their total take home pay, 
many service members remain in a tax bracket in which the tax rates are relatively low. 
Service members who spend any portion of a month in a combat zone are exempt from 
federal taxes for that month. Additionally, the state of Florida does not collect income tax, 
and since all naval aviators go through Pensacola, Florida, for training, many aviators will 
make Florida their legal residence and maintain legal residence there for the remainder of 
their careers. This has the effect of totally exempting them from paying state income tax.  
6. Retirement 
The military has one of the most generous retirement plans available today. After 
twenty years of service, service members can retire and immediately start receiving half 
their base pay for the rest of their lives. For service members who remain in the military, 
the percentage of base pay goes up each additional year after the initial 20 years. 
However, should a service member leave before 20 years of service, he or she receives no 
retirement pay. That means that an aviator can typically be retired from the Navy at age 
42 and start an entirely new career while collecting their retirement as a supplemental 
paycheck. This retirement plan has been particularly attractive to aviators more than 
members of other communities. Given the long time required to train and the subsequent 
long minimum service obligation, many aviators, pilots especially, are at almost ten years 
of service before they are able to leave the service. After having invested so much time 
already, and with not that much more time to go, many aviators decide to try to stay to 
twenty years in order to receive the retirement benefits.  
The Navy has recently revamped its retirement plan as a cost saving measure and 
introduced a system closer to a civilian 401k plan. The new plan is referred to as a 
“blended” solution in that it blends the traditional Navy 20-year retirement and the 
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typical civilian 401k. It is set to go into effect on 01 Jan 2018 (Parrish, 2016). All current 
service members can choose to be grandfathered in to the old system should they so 
desire, but all service members entering service after 01 Jan 2018 will be under the new 
retirement plan (Parrish, 2016). Under the new program service members can make 
contributions to a Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account that is much like a civilian 401k. 
The military will automatically contribute 1% of a service member’s base pay into the 
TSP even if the service member contributes nothing (Parrish, 2016). After two years of 
service, the military will match the service member’s contributions up to 3% of their 
paycheck and contribute fifty cents to the dollar for the next 2% above that for a possible 
total of 4% contribution by the military (Parrish, 2016). In addition, all service members 
will be offered a mid-career bonus equal to at least two and a half months of basic pay in 
return for agreeing to an additional four years of service (Parrish, 2016). For an aviator 
this would work out to about $18,075 based on 2017 pay scales. The military will still 
offer immediate payments if a service member retires after twenty years, but those 
payouts will be less than they have been in the past (Parrish, 2016). The payments into 
the TSP will become available without tax penalties at the age of 65, much like a civilian 
401k (Parrish, 2016). 
There has been concern that this new retirement plan may negatively affect 
retention. Under the new system, service members will be able to leave the Navy with 
some retirement funds intact, even if they get out before twenty years, which is unlike the 
old system in which they got nothing. The prize at the end of 20 years, however, is 
significantly less. This means a much weaker incentive to stay all the way to twenty years. 
It is expected that most service members who plan to stay for twenty or more years will 
choose to remain in the old retirement system during the transition phase since the lifetime 
payouts are greater. The effects of these changes will not be observable for several years. 
7. Military Services 
There are a multitude of compensations to military personnel that are not revealed 
on a monthly pay stub. Among them are access to base commissaries and Morale Welfare 
and Recreation (MWR) facilities and activities. Commissaries are subsidized by the 
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military in order to offer groceries to military families at significant discounts. MWR also 
has gym facilities, barbers, movie theaters, recreational gear renting, and activities 
exclusively for military and their families.  
8. Civilian-Offered Discounts 
Many civilian companies will offer military discounts and services in order to show 
appreciation for military service. These can come in the form of discounts at the register at 
retail outlets, free checked baggage or seat upgrades at airports, or free meals on Veteran’s 
Day. Many credit cards also offer to waive annual fees on luxury credit cards which allow 
service members access to all the amenities and services associated with those cards. This 
is an expansion of the benefits and protections already offered under the Service-members 
Civil Relief Act (SCRA), which protects the service member from exorbitant credit debt, 
being evicted while on deployment, penalties for breaking leases while under military 
orders, and other situations (United States Department of Justice, 2015).  
9. Fly Pay 
Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP), commonly called “fly pay,” is a monthly 
pay add-on designed to compensate aviators for serving in a high-risk field, and to 
incentivize them to stay in aviation. ACIP amounts are calculated according to years of 
aviation service, which includes flight training. The amounts are laid out in Table 2. 
















The large jumps in pay at 6 and 14 years coincide with major stay/leave decision 
points within an aviator’s career. After 22 years, the pay begins to decrease as aviators 
transition to more of a management role and do less actual flying. 
C. CURRENT ACCP STRUCTURE 
Given the time and money required to train and maintain proficiency of Naval 
Aviators, it is essential that the Navy be able to retain the personnel in these high skilled 
positions. The Navy has for a long time offered bonuses in order to do this and the 
current program is the Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP). This is commonly 
referred to in the Aviation community as “the bonus.” It is not to be confused with ACIP, 
which was discussed previously. ACCP is divided into two subcategories; Aviation 
Department Head Retention Bonus (ADHRB), and Aviation Command Retention Bonus 
(ACRB), designed to incentivize Aviators to stay for their Department Head tour and a 
Commanding Officer’s (CO) tour respectively.  
1. Aviation Department Head Retention Bonus 
The ADHRB is designed to incentivize aviators to complete a Department Head 
tour. In order to do so, officers must weather two screening processes. At 9 or 10 years of 
active service Aviators are reviewed for promotion to lieutenant commander (O4). 
Whether officers are reviewed at 9 or 10 years depends on a multitude of factors not in 
the control of the officer. If the officer has a “Failure of Selection” (FOS) determination 
they are given one more look the following year. If aviators do not promote a second 
time, they are separated from the Navy. After an aviator is selected to O4 they may 
choose to compete for orders as a Department Head. This selection board occurs in the 
fiscal year following their promotion to O4. This board has three looks with the first two 
being considered for operational Department Head and the third being considered for 
operational training Department Head (Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], 2015). Unlike 
failing to select to O4, however, an aviator may remain in the Navy and the aviation 
community even after two FOS’s to Department Head. Of note, if officers are selected to 
O4 they are generally able to remain in active service long enough to reach twenty years 
and the retirement benefits that many desire. However, if they do not select to 
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Department Head, they are generally not expected to be promoted to commander (O5) if 
they stay in the aviation community. They may, however, be promoted if they decide to 
change communities. 
As the ADHRB program currently stands, an aviator may sign up for the bonus a 
year before the date of their Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) (ADHRB FY17). 
ADSO is calculated from the date the officer is designated as an aviator or “winging.” 
Pilots incur an eight-year obligation upon winging, and NFOs a six-year obligation. The 
time from commissioning to winging is also generally shorter for an NFO, so they are 
able to take the bonus earlier in their careers than pilots. Upon taking the bonus, an 
aviator is obligated to five additional years of aviation service beginning on their ADSO 
or contract acceptance, whichever is later (FY17 Aviation Department Head Retention 
Bonus Program [ADHRB], 2017). Additionally, they are required to remain in the 
aviation community, to compete for Department Head orders and, if they are selected, to 
execute those orders. In return, the aviator is offered an equal lump-sum bonus payment 
each year for five years beginning at their ADSO. If aviators opt to take the bonus early, 
they will receive six payments starting a year before their ADSO, but their total payouts 
will remain the same (ADHRB, 2017). Congress has authorized up to $25k a year for this 
bonus  (37 U.S.C § 301b, 2016). Previously, the Navy gave the entire $25k to both pilots 
and NFOs. Over time, however, the Navy has gotten more specific as to how it 
administers the bonus. First it was broken down so that pilots and NFOs received 
different bonuses. The Navy later broke it down even further into Type/Model/Series (T/
M/S) of aircraft. In this context T/M/S refers to the subcommunity within aviation all 
members of which generally fly the same type of aircraft. For instance, VFA is the strike 
fighter community and all members currently fly some variant of the F/A-18. In the VP 
community, even though this community is currently transitioning from the P-3 Orion 
aircraft to the P-8 Poseidon aircraft, all members are grouped together as the VP (Patrol) 
community. The reason the Navy chose to become more and more specific is to avoid 
overpaying subcommunities that were not facing shortages. They did not want to pay VP 
NFOs more when really who the Navy was trying to keep were VFA pilots. The total 
amounts of the bonuses offered over five years for 2009–2017 are given in Table 3. 
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Table 3.   ADHRB Total Amounts 2009–2017. 
 
In FY09 the same bonus was offered to all aviators (Pilot and NFO). In FY10 it was broken down only by 
Pilot vs. NFO. Subsequently, it was divided by Type/Model/Series (T/M/S). Data compiled from PERS-
435 ACCP/ACIP program officer personal communication, FY-15 ADHRB Program Information, FY-16 
ADHRB Program Information, and FY-17 ADHRB Program Information. 
 
If aviators fail to select for either O4 or Department Head, the officers may keep 
what payments have been made, but will not receive further payments. If an aviator 
voluntarily leaves the Navy before his or her obligation is complete, or if they do not 
accept Department Head orders when offered, the officer must repay any funds already 
received. (FY16 ADHRB Program Information, 2016).  
The Navy has allowed some flexibility in this contract. Though it is not obligated 
to do so, the aviation community regularly allows those who have FOSed once for O4 to 
transfer to a different community and retain the funds they have received. The reasoning 
behind this is that officers who do not make it to O4 on the first look are unlikely to make 
it on the second and if they do make it on the second look there is even less probability 
that they will then select for Department Head. So, instead of forcing these individuals to 
stay in aviation and likely FOS a second time and be forced out of the Navy, the aviation 
community allows them to transfer to a different community where they may be more 
likely to select to O4 and continue to be of service to the Navy. This effectively saves the 
Navy from forcing out officers who could still be of value in a different community. The 
drawback of this policy is that it could incentivize low performers to take the bonus, 
Designator T/M/S FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY17
HM $125K $125K $50K $50K $75K $75K $75K $75K
HC/HS/HSC $125K $125K $50K $75K $75K $75K $75K $75K
HSL/HSM $125K $125K $50K $25K $75K $75K $75K $75K
VAQ $125K $125K $75K $125K $125K $125K $125K $125K
VAW/VRC $125K $125K $25K $50K $50K $125K $125K $125K
VFA $125K $125K $125K $125K $125K $125K $125K $125K
VP $125K $125K $50K $50K $50K $75K $75K $75K
VQ(P) $125K $125K $50K $75K $75K $75K $75K $75K
VQ(T) $125K $125K $25K $75K $75K $75K $75K $75K
VAQ $125K $75K $100K $100K $100K $100K $100K $100K
VAW $125K $75K $25K $50K $50K $75K $75K $75K
VFA $125K $75K $50K $50K $50K $75K $75K $75K
VP $125K $75K $50K $75K $75K $75K $75K $75K
VQ(P) $125K $75K $50K $50K $50K $50K $75K $75K




knowing that they are not likely to select to O4 but giving them a way to stay in the Navy 
if they are able to transfer to a different community while also keeping the bonus money. 
This drawback is mitigated by the fact that it is often difficult to transfer to a different 
community after a single FOS. 
2. Aviation Command Retention Bonus (ACRB) 
The ACRB is set up differently than the ADHRB. The ACRB is only offered to 
aviators who have already applied for, been selected, and are actively serving as 
Commanding Officer of a squadron (FY16 Aviation Command Retention Bonus Program 
[ACRB], 2016). The bonus is set at $18,000 per year, the first instalment of which is to 
be paid upon contract acceptance, and the second instalment a year later. The contract 
obligates the officer to their 21st and 22nd years of service. Should the officer apply for 
the bonus after their 20th year of service then the two-year obligation begins upon the 
application’s acceptance by the Navy (ACRB, 2016). The offer expires the day the 
aviator relinquishes command of the squadron (ACRB, 2016).  
Most officers complete their CO tour in their 19th year of service. So, assuming 
they accept the bonus immediately, they are being paid while they are CO for years they 
will pay back later. Part of the reason the bonus pays out before the obligated service 
kicks in is that the Navy saw it prudent to ensure that aviation Department Heads who 
were currently receiving their ADHRB bonus were not making more money than the CO.  
D. HISTORY OF THE ACCP 
The bonuses offered to aviators have taken numerous forms over the years. As 
Watson outlines in her work on the ACCP, the Navy relied heavily on reservists in the 
1970s. She notes that the percentage of Navy pilots who were reservists reached as high 
as 35% from 1971–1972. Watson observed that this fell off to 13% by 1980, but it 
became clear that the Navy needed to do a better job of retaining its active duty aviators. 
According to her work, the earliest form of the bonus was the Aviation Officer 
Continuation Pay, which was offered from 1981–1982 and 1984–1988. That bonus 
program was then changed to the Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) in 1989.  
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Moore and Griffis (1999) outline in their work the reasons the Navy set aside the 
old ACP in favor of the ACCP. According to these authors, the ACP was a DOD-wide 
authorization to offer a bonus of up to $12,000 a year to aviation officers who had 
completed between 6 and 13 years of service and obligated them to serve through the 14th 
year of service. No payments were to be made to those in excess of 14 years of service. 
Moore and Griffis indicate that one of the problems with this program was that many 
takers would attrite before fulfilling their obligations. This could happen through failure 
to select to O4, injury, or by transferring to a different community. The latter problem 
was because, although the program obligated service to 14 years, it did not keep aviators 
from transferring to a different community. Moore and Griffis further note that the 
$12,000 maximum bonus level was worth significantly less in 1999 than at its inception 
in 1989 and that the bonus level needed to change in order to keep up with inflation and 
continue to be an effective incentive. 
Finally, in fiscal year 2000, the DOD incorporated the ACCP, which is the current 
system. However, the bonus is adjusted yearly not only in amount but also in the details 
of how it is paid out, when aviators are eligible, and what their obligations are. While 
these adjustments are relatively minor, they can affect bonus take-rates. An internal 
memo outlining the history of the ACCP obtained from a program officer with PERS 435 
states that at the inception of the ACCP, the bonus maximum was raised from $12,000 a 
year to $25,000 a year DOD-wide (personal communication, November 4, 2016). ACCP 
was also extended to offer the bonus up to 25 years of service. The Navy used this new 
program to specifically target aviators to not just stay in the aviation community but to 
take sea duty and command billets. Initially the ACCP offered two- to three-year 
contracts of up to $15,000, and it was offered only to those assigned to sea duty (personal 
communication, November 4, 2016). The memo notes that this did not address the issue 
of retaining Junior Officers past their minimum service obligation, as many reached that 
point while on shore duty. Per the memo, the program was modified mid-year to also 
allow five-year contracts for which pilots were paid $25,000 a year and NFOs $15,000. 
Those taking the five-year contracts were offered half of the sum upfront (personal 
communication, November 4, 2016). 
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The 2001 bonus was similar to the modified 2000 bonus with the exception that 
aviators under contract in the previous ACP contract were offered three-year contracts at 
the new bonus levels in order to provide an equitable transition from one system to the 
other (personal communication, November 4, 2016). 
The major amendment made to the program in 2002 was to offer the bonus a year 
prior to the end of an aviator’s ADSO. This allowed an aviator to receive the bonus 
incentive at a time that they were making the critical stay or leave decision (personal 
communication, November 4, 2016). This program was continued in 2003. 
The adjustment in 2004 was that the lump sum payment was held until the aviator 
was successfully screened for Department Head. Until that occurred, they were paid 
annual instalments (personal communication, November 4, 2016). This saved the Navy 
from paying large sums to those who would eventually not fulfill their entire obligation. 
Additionally, it payed less to the low-type officers who were the ones that failed to screen 
for Department Head. 
In 2005, the three-year option was eliminated to ensure that aviators who took a 
bonus would stay through their Department Head screen board. On top of this, the Navy 
stopped payment of the contract if the aviator failed to screen for Department Head 
according to the memo on the history of the ACCP. In this sense, this was really the first 
year that the bonus became specifically a Department Head bonus, as opposed to a 
general retention bonus. With this change, the only bonus available would obligate 
officers to try to screen for Department Head. If those officers were not selected, bonus 
payments would stop. 
The next major change came in 2011 when the Navy began varying bonus 
amounts based on Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) (personal communication, November 4, 
2016). This had the net effect of reducing most bonus levels due to excess retention while 
maintaining bonus levels in critical platforms. Additionally, lump sum payments were 
removed from the contract in favor of equal annual payments (personal communication, 
November 4, 2016). 
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In 2014, after several years of fluctuating bonus levels for each community, the 
Navy introduced a “rate lock” system (personal communication, November 4, 2016). 
Under this system if officers were to take the bonus one year and the bonus level changed 
the next year, they would receive the higher of the two bonus levels. This cut down on 
“buyer’s remorse” and prevented aviators from avoiding signing the contract in hopes the 
bonus level would go up the following year. 
The 2015 contract changed slightly how the bonus is paid out. For aviators whose 
ADSO is in FY15, the payout begins not earlier than the ADSO in five equal instalments. 
For those with an ADSO in FY16, they can receive the money earlier and receive six 
equal payments starting not earlier than one year prior to their ADSO (FY15 ADHRB 
Program Information, 2015). 
The Navy continues to learn from past experiences and to adjust the bonus to 
current retention and economic situations. It is difficult to identify the exact effects of 
each change in the bonus as they are adjusted yearly and thus it is impossible to separate 
what effect the bonus had on retention versus what are just year effects. If the bonus 
changed its structure and retention went up, it could be because of the change in structure 
or it could be that the economy was worse that year, which made people want to stay in 
the Navy, or an event happened that sparked feelings of patriotism, or countless other 
factors that could be the real reason for the increase in retention. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the military has tried to grapple with rapidly escalating personnel costs, many 
studies have been undertaken to determine how to keep the necessary personnel while 
keeping costs to a minimum. Studies have investigated bonuses similar to the ACCP; 
these include the Air Force’s Aviator Retention Pay (ARP) and the Surface Navy’s 
Surface Warfare Office Continuation Pay (SWOCP). Studies on market forces and 
civilian compensation structures can also help to guide the Navy’s use of retention 
bonuses. Each have approached the problem from a different angle and the intent here is 
to build upon their work as well as use literature on economic theory and civilian 
contracts to build a new bonus system. 
A. ACADEMIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Market Signaling 
In his seminal work, “Job Market Signaling,” Michael Spence describes hiring as 
a decision made under uncertainty. An employer does not know the value of the potential 
employee prior to making the decision to hire them. They must therefore rely on certain 
“signals” that the employee will send regarding their productive capabilities (Spence, 
1973). To illustrate, Spence uses education as an example. If a job applicant has an 
education, it will signal to the employer that he or she will be a better employee because 
it is only cost effective for high-type (more capable) people to get an education. This is 
because it costs high-type workers less time, effort, and often money (scholarships) to 
obtain an education. However, if education was at no cost to the potential employee—in 
terms of time, money, and effort—then everyone would get an education and education 
would lose its signaling effects. The reason that education is an effective signal to 
employers is that it costs high-type employees less time, money, and effort to get an 
education than it costs low-type (less capable) employees. It is too costly for low-type 
employees to mimic the behavior of high-type employees by getting an education, and 
therefore it signals to the employer that person’s type because of the lack of education. 
Applicants, therefore, self-select into two categories: those that get an education and 
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those that do not, based on the relative cost to the individual. This is how high-type 
applicants signal to the potential employer that they are productive workers (Spence, 
1973). 
In this paper, this theory is applied to the bonus system and a structure is devised 
whereby bonus takers self-select themselves into the appropriate category of their quality, 
thereby signaling to the Navy how much bonus should be paid to them. They will select 
the bonus structure that maximizes their own outcome and signals to the Navy their 
relative value. This will prevent the Navy from having to determine whom to offer a large 
bonus and whom to offer a smaller bonus. Allowing officers to choose for themselves 
what bonus they receive will also avoid any perceived unfairness on the part of the Navy 
and any decline in morale associated with it. 
2. Menu of Contracts 
In his work, “Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts,” Wang investigates 
how employers and potential employees bargain over two dimensions: quality and wage. 
In this scenario the worker has private information about his type, whether he is a high-
type worker or low-type worker. Wang assumes that the employer can make an offer and 
the worker can either accept or reject it. This is the same scenario as the current Navy 
bonus program; the Navy offers a bonus, and any individual officer can accept it or reject 
it. When bargaining over a single dimension, say price, the uninformed party has a single 
mechanism to induce separation: time. An employer can make an offer that is accepted or 
rejected. If it is rejected, another offer can be made. This continues until the offer is 
accepted or the employer is not willing to increase the wage any further. Real world 
constraints prevent the Navy from being able to negotiate in this manner and thus it is 
unable to achieve maximum efficiency because it can make just a single bonus offer. 
However, Wang finds that when bargaining over multiple dimensions, the employer can 
use a menu of contracts to induce the informed party to self-select into the appropriate 
category of high-type or low-type.  
Applied to the Navy, the two dimensions the Navy is bargaining over are quality 
and price. The Navy wants to retain the highest quality officers while paying the right 
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bonus amount. Wang finds that instead of requiring multiple steps and having the 
uninformed party (Navy) at a distinct disadvantage, when a menu of contracts is offered 
only a single step is required. The informed party immediately separates him or herself 
according to type of worker (Wang, 1998). This maximizes the officer’s own benefit as 
well as the Navy’s. 
Kuhn and Yockey delve more specifically into what scenarios make people more 
likely to favor a lower paying, guaranteed salary with potential for more earnings based 
on performance, over a flat-rate salary. They found that people were not risk averse and 
often preferred the lower guaranteed salary with performance-based incentives (Kuhn et 
al., 2003). However, some stipulations had to be met to make people more likely to prefer 
the riskier option. The situations in which people were most likely to favor such an 
arrangement included where their incentives were based on personal performance, as 
opposed to team or company performance. People wanted their compensation to be in 
their own hands and were more optimistic about receiving incentives when it was (Kuhn 
et al., 2003.) This fits well with the Navy where FITREPs, billet selection, and 
promotions are all based on individual performance and measured as such. In this sense, a 
menu-of-contracts system would be welcomed by aviation officers. 
3. Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 
In the insurance industry, insurers try to charge the correct amount for insurance 
based upon how risky they believe an individual to be. Were they to offer the same price 
to all applicants, the insurer would lose money on risky individuals because they would 
have to pay out more often. They would also fail to attract low-risk individuals because it 
is not worth it to these individuals to pay the high price of insurance when their risk is 
low. By the same token, the Navy must offer the bonus based on the quality of the 
individual. This is based on the assumption that high-quality individuals have more 
opportunities in the civilian job market and are therefore more likely to leave the Navy 
than low-quality individuals. If the Navy offers one bonus, then low-quality individuals 
will benefit because they are being paid more money than it takes to convince them to 
 26
remain in the service. It will also fail to convince high-quality individuals to stay, because 
they are not being paid what is necessary to keep them.  
Many parallels can be drawn between the decision of how much bonus to offer an 
individual officer and the decision by an insurance company concerning the amount of 
insurance to offer an individual or company. Both decisions have elements of moral 
hazard and adverse selection. According to Chassagnon and Chiappori, adverse selection 
refers to contracts in which one party has information that the other party does not. In the 
insurance industry framework, in which Chassagnon and Chiappori work, that refers to 
the insured individual, who has information on how risky he or she is, which is 
information that the insurer does not have. Applied to the aviation bonus, this would be 
the individual aviator who knows his own quality and capabilities better than the Navy 
does. Moral hazard, according to Chassagnon and Chiappori, refers to a situation in 
which the outcome depends on a decision by one party that the other party cannot 
observe. The authors give the example that an insured entity can decide to incur a cost 
(i.e., increased training to reduce accidents at a manufacturing plant) that reduces their 
risk. If only partially insured, the insured company may be willing to incur this cost 
because there is a penalty to them should they suffer an accident. They have to pay for 
some of the cost of that accident. On the other hand, if that entity is insured totally, they 
have no incentive to incur the cost of reducing their risk because they are compensated 
fully for any costs of an accident. The insurer cannot observe the specific actions that an 
insured entity will take that will affect how risky they are, so they cannot reward those 
actions specifically, but they can still incentivize that entity to take those actions by 
making it in both the insurer and insured’s best interests. Applied to the Navy aviation 
community, this refers to the amount of effort expended by an individual officer, which is 
a cost to him or her. That officer may choose to put forth maximum effort if there is the 
expectation of a reward. However, if the officer can expect the same retention bonus 
whether they perform well or not, there is no incentive to put forth that effort. Just as the 
insurer wants to incentivize the insured to invest in measures to become less risky, the 
Navy wants to incentivize aviators to invest their effort into becoming high performers 
with the understanding that both parties benefit from it. 
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Chassagnon and Chiappori conclude that separating equilibrium can be achieved 
through different equilibrium contracts. Separating equilibrium means that high-risk 
individuals will be separated from low-risk individuals so that the insurer can apply the 
correct insurance policy. For the Navy, this means separating high performers from low 
performers and offering them the appropriate bonus. Through the offering of separate 
contracts this can be accomplished. 
They also draw a direct correlation between a high deductible and lower riskiness. 
This means that risk is not static. If proper incentives are applied, individuals will adjust 
their own level of risk. This coincides with level of effort on the part of a Navy aviator. If 
the aviator stands to lose more, should he not select to Department Head, then he or she 
will be incentivized to incur the cost of additional effort in order to prevent that situation. 
Simply put, if there is a difference in pay between making Department Head and not 
making it, then an aviator will try harder to be selected to Department Head. 
B. RELATED MILITARY STUDIES 
1. Assessing Officer Quality 
In order to determine if the Navy is keeping high quality officers, we must 
determine how to measure officer quality. The obvious solution is to look at officer 
fitness reports (FITREPs). FITREPs are conducted once a year at minimum, also any 
time a Commanding Officer (CO) rotates, and when the individual service member 
rotates. In the aviation community, COs “fleet up,” that is, first they are the Executive 
Officer (XO) or second in command, and then they flow into the role of CO. So for each 
CO tour, the officer serves one year as XO and one year as CO. This means that COs 
change every year and usually means that an officer will get two FITREPs a year, one for 
their annual, and one for the CO check out. Additionally, an officer will receive a final 
FITREP when he or she is checking out of a command. In her 2006 study on the effects 
of the SWOCP bonus in retaining quality officers, Lorio develops a formula to 
standardize FITREP scores (Lorio, 2006). 
In any FITREP Navy-wide, a sailor is evaluated on several traits and given a 
score from 1 to 5. Those traits are: 
 28
 Professional expertise—Professional knowledge, proficiency, and 
qualifications. 
 Command or organizational climate/equal opportunity—Contributing to 
growth and development, human worth, community. 
 Military bearing/character—Appearance, conduct, physical fitness, 
adherence to Navy Core Values. 
 Teamwork—Contributions toward team building and team results.  
 Mission accomplishment and initiative—Taking initiative, planning, 
prioritizing, achieving mission. 
 Leadership—Organizing, motivating and developing others to accomplish 
goals.  
 Tactical performance—(Warfare qualified officers only) Basic and tactical 
employment of weapon systems. (Department of the Navy [DON], 2008) 
These scores are averaged to come up with a Member Trait Average (MTA). 
However, some reporting seniors may generally score people higher or lower than other 
reporting seniors. In order to account for this variability, each FITREP is accompanied by 
the Reporting Senior’s Cumulative Average (RSCUMAVG), which is the average of all 
the traits that reporting senior has ranked in all their subordinates up to that FITREP. 
Lorio uses these factors to come up with an adjusted MTA using the following formula: 
MTAadjusted = (MTA – RSCUMAVG) / (5.0 – RSCUMAVG) 
She then adds a time-decay factor to come up with what she calls the Level of 
Officer Retention and Inventory Optimizer (LORIO) score, which is a numeric value 
between negative 1 and 1. The purpose of the time-decay factor is to more heavily weight 
the scores of more recent FITREPs as opposed to older ones (Lorio, 2006).  
In practice, officer’s MTAs are not the most important part of the FITREP. What 
holds far more weight is the section of the FITREP that ranks the officer against his 
peers. More often than not COs, knowing how much more important ranking is to screen 
boards and officer advancement, will rank their officers and then make the MTAs match 
accordingly. This is part of the reason that it is desirable for an officer wishing to advance 
to go to a command at which they compete with a large pool of junior officers. A final 
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FITREP listing the officer as 1st out of 30 is far more desirable than one listing 1st out of 
5 or even 1st out of 1. 
While FITREPS are an important way to measure officer quality, it is not the only 
way the Navy decides the overall value of a given sailor. The Navy also wants officers to 
take challenging, competitive jobs. These jobs may be valuable to the Navy because they 
have determined that they add to the overall development of an aviation officer, or they 
may be of value because they are difficult jobs that must be filled. An officer could get a 
high LORIO score by getting good FITREPs, but if that is done while taking jobs that the 
Navy does not consider to be high priority, or if the officer is not competing with many 
other officers, then that officer may not have the highest value to the Navy. The LORIO 
score also does not take into account non-observed FITREPs, which are given in certain 
commands including training commands and educational institutions. Separating good 
officers from bad ones is not nearly as simple as looking at FITREP scores. Luckily, 
processes are already in place that determine the overall value of an officer to the aviation 
community: the respective selection boards to O4 and for Department Head. This simple 
metric more accurately encompasses the value that the community places on the officer’s 
skills and experience.  
2. Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay 
The Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) has historically been a 
one-size-fits-all bonus similar to the ACCP but offered to Surface Warfare Officers to 
incentivize them to stay in the SWO community and complete two Department Head 
tours. Of note, Department Head tours in the SWO community are lieutenant billets as 
opposed to lieutenant commander billets for aviation. This is due to the time to train in 
aviation, which only allows for one squadron tour before being considered for O4. 
Several studies have pointed to the ineffectiveness of the SWOCP bonus. Lorio 
concludes that the SWOCP is a tool for retention of quantity but fails to retain quality 
officers (Lorio, 2006). Additionally, Marenko finds that retention of SWO officers is 
affected significantly by economic health indicated by national unemployment rates and 
showed no correlation between SWOCP levels and SWO retention (Marenko, 2014). 
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In 2015 the SWO community recognized the limitations of a one-size-fits-all 
bonus and adopted a bonus system that rewarded good performance and incentivized 
officers to commit to the bonus early in their careers. Under the new bonus system, 
officers who are screened for Department Head on their first look and who accept the 
bonus immediately are able to make a total of $105k paid through to their 10th year of 
commissioned service. Those screening for Department Head on their second look can 
make $95k, and those screening on their third look can make $75k. Initial payments for 
those screened on their first or second look are $10k a year and then go up to $15k a year 
after six years of commissioned service (CNO, 2016). Should an officer delay in signing 
up for the bonus, those initial payments are forfeited for each year the officer delays. 
The problems with the SWOCP bonus mirror closely those of the ACCP. There 
has been a perception in the Navy that the SWO community does not retain high-quality 
officers and is forced to promote and retain lower-quality officers as a result. This leads 
to the poor leadership that many officers list as a reason for their exit from the Navy 
(Stoker, 2008). It has become a vicious cycle of poor retention and poor leadership. The 
SWO community aimed to break this cycle with its new bonus system, the effects of 
which remain to be seen. If the aviation community does not change how it retains its 
officers, it could fall into the same cycle the SWO community has been in. 
3. AF Pilot Retention 
A recent RAND report lead by Mattock does a thorough investigation of the 
impact of increased commercial airline hiring on Air Force pilot retention and what is 
needed to encourage Air Force pilots to stay Air Force. A number of factors have 
combined to lead experts to project that commercial airline hiring will increase in the 
next 20 years. High on that list is the fact that the aviation workforce is aging and the 
FAA has a mandatory retirement age of 65. When the baby boomers hit that mark, the 
airlines will need to have replacements on hand. The RAND report additionally notes that 
the FAA has recently made changes to requirements for pilot rest and requirements for 
minimum flying hours required to qualify as an airline transport pilot, both of which will 
add to airline demand for pilots. This is all compounded by the general increase in 
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demand for air transportation. True to the principles of supply and demand, the report 
observes that the salaries of pilots have also seen a marked increase back to levels 
observed in the late 1990s. This trend is expected to continue as the major airlines have 
come to an agreement with the pilot’s union to increase pilot pay by approximately 17% 
from 2014 to 2018 (Mattock, 2016). 
In order for the airlines to compensate for attrition due to pilot retirement alone, 
maintaining the current pilot inventory, Mattock determines that the airlines would have 
to increase hiring from 1,200 a year in 2014 to more than 2,800 in 2024. That is without 
bringing into account the projected growth in the airline industry. To determine how the 
growth in industry would affect pilot hiring they used passenger miles as an indicator. 
They projected a 29% increase in passenger miles by 2025. This effect on pilot hiring is 
mitigated somewhat by moderate increases in passenger miles per pilot (Mattock, 2016). 
The study acknowledges a level of uncertainty in how airline hiring will increase 
and therefore investigates high, middle, and low levels of increase. They determine that 
increasing hires from 1,700 to 2,900 (low-level increase) per year would correspond to an 
increase in probability that a pilot will be hired by a major airline from 10% to 40%. The 
middle level increase to 3,200 hires would mean a 50% probability of being hired. And 
hiring levels at 3,800 would mean a 70% chance of being hired. Taking the middle 
estimate, an increase to 50% probability of being hired would lead to a 6.3% drop in Air 
Force pilot retention, or more than 800 pilots per year. While hiring is increasing for the 
major airlines, so are wages. Combining the middle estimate of 3,200 hires and a 
projected wage increase of 13% for pilots would lead to a decrease in force size of 12.3% 
or 1,587 pilots according to the report (Mattock, 2016).  
Having determined how much Air Force pilot retention will be affected by 
changes in the airline industry, the study then seeks to determine how much the Air Force 
pilot retention bonus (ARP) would have to increase in order to offset these effects. The 
Air Force, much like the Navy, has two different pay extras for pilots. Aviator Pay (AP) 
equates to the Navy’s Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) and is a monthly pay for all 
aviators up to $840 a month. The Air Force’s Aviator Retention Pay (ARP) is similar to 
the Navy’s ACCP and is a bonus offered to aviators in return for signing a contract for 
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three years, five years, or until-20-years-of-aviation-service. This bonus is currently 
capped by DOD at $25,000 per year. Using a modification of the Dynamic Retention 
Model (DRM) that the Air Force uses, the study concludes that with an increase of hiring 
to 3,200 a year and increased wages of 13% the ARP bonus would have to increase 94% 
to offset the retention losses. The range from best case assumptions to worst case 
assumptions produced a range of ARP increases from 54% to 151% (Mattock 2016). 
The RAND study stops short of recommending that the Air Force increase ARP 
to that level, but does recommend that the DOD ask Congress to increase the cap on pilot 
bonus pay so that each service can react more quickly to the changing market demand for 
pilots in the civilian airline industry. 
This study has obvious parallels with what the Navy will face in the coming years 
as well. Navy pilots will be faced with the same stay or leave decisions as Air Force 
pilots and will have the same growing opportunities as pilots in the civilian aviation 
industry. However, the DRM which the Air Force uses has been shown to not accurately 
predict Navy pilot retention (Watson, 2012). Regardless of the precision of the DRM 
model for the Navy, the trends remain the same, and the Navy can expect the same 
retention issues that the Air Force has seen. The Air Force’s solution has been to ask 
Congress for a dramatic increase in the pilot bonus cap as part of the 2017 National 
Defense Authorization Act (Daniels, 2016). This will be enormously costly. By 
increasing the efficiency with which we administer the Navy’s bonus, we can hopefully 
keep retention up without breaking the bank.  
4. Navy Aviation Bonus as an Auction System 
There has been discussion in the aviation community of instituting an auction 
system for the aviation retention bonus. The premise behind these proposed systems is 
that each aviator puts in a bid for how much of a bonus they are willing to accept in order 
to stay on for a Department Head tour and a minimum service commitment. The lowest 
bidders are retained and promoted. 
The three primary variations of the auction system are the uniform-price auction, 
the Quality Adjusted Discount Auction (QUAD), and the Combinatorial Retention 
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Auction Mechanism (CRAM). Charts depicting the details of these auctions can be found 
in the Appendix. Under the uniform price auction, every aviator is offered the same 
bonus which is equal to one bid higher than the last person retained. The main drawback 
of this method is that the quality of the aviator is not taken into account. This problem is 
mitigated somewhat by the QUAD auction in which aviators bids are given “discounts” 
based on previous performance. This way, an aviator who has achieved certain 
milestones can be retained even if their bid was higher than what the cutoff would have 
been under the uniform-price system. A major obstacle to implementation of this system 
is determining what performance metrics to reward and how much. The Navy values not 
just FITREP scores but also aviators who take challenging billets and succeed in them. 
The QUAD system quickly loses the human element that a traditional screen board takes 
into account and instead becomes an exercise in how many “points” an aviator can rack 
up prior to the auction.  
Finally, the CRAM auction takes into account non-monetary incentives that an 
aviator may value. It gives the aviator the opportunity to put not just an amount of cash 
that they desire to remain in aviation, but also other potential incentives such as graduate 
education, geographic stability in follow-on orders, or other pre-determined incentives 
that they Navy would offer as options. This method also runs into trouble in 
implementation as the Navy would have to first determine a monetary value for each of 
these incentives. How does the Navy price graduate education when it currently offers it 
for free to many officers with the understanding that the Navy gets inherently more value 
from a better educated workforce? Furthermore, a stipulation of the system is that every 
aviator, if their adjusted bid is low enough, is retained and granted whatever monetary 
and non-monetary incentive they requested. Many of the programs that would 
presumably be available as an incentive have strict quotas that are outside the aviation 
community’s control or even outside the control of the Navy as a whole. Also, the Navy 
often requires an officer to move in order to meet certain needs and also to keep the 
officer progressing in their career. Meeting every officer’s non-monetary requests would 
be a herculean task at best and would likely just not be possible. 
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A final shortcoming that applies to all of the auction systems is that auctions do 
not fit into the current promotion and screening system. Promotion boards are sat on by 
officers of all different communities in order to ensure that each officer selected for 
promotion is worthy of that rank. It is not within the aviation community’s power to hand 
the promotion board a list of personnel that it would like to promote, especially if that list 
is not directly linked to prior performance but rather based on how much they are willing 
to work for. 
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IV. PROBLEMS FACING AVIATOR RETENTION 
The rigid structure of junior officers’ promotions in their first years of service and 
the Navy’s preference for egalitarian pay structures makes retaining the best performers 
while culling the worst a difficult task. It is critical, however, to the continued excellence 
of the U.S. aviation force that we do just that. Identifying top performers and 
incentivizing them to stay is critical to any organization. Moreover, motivating middle 
and low performers to become top performers is even more important. This proposal 
should accomplish these goals. 
The problem that the Navy faces is twofold. First, it needs to ensure that it is 
retaining the highest quality officers and in the appropriate quantities. To focus solely on 
quantity could lead to the same vicious cycle of poor leadership and poor retention as is 
perceived to occur in the SWO community. To focus solely on quality will leave billets 
unmanned. Second, it needs to make sure it is accomplishing this with the maximum 
efficiency possible. This means keeping the right people, and paying the right amount to 
induce them to remain in aviation and compete for Department Head and command 
billets respectively.  
The Navy has the added constraint that morale and parity play a large role in 
compensation decisions. The Navy does not like to be perceived as paying people 
differently. The military pay scales are uniform across all services and are in the public 
domain available for all to see. This is part of the reason that the Navy and the military as 
a whole have shied away from pay-for-performance compensation structures. The 
military tends to rely on the assumption that higher performance will lead to faster 
promotion and as a result, increased pay. However, for the Navy at the junior officer level 
(O1-O3), promotions are based primarily on time in rank and not on performance. The 
first time a junior officer’s promotion is dependent on their performance is promotion to 
the rank of O4, nine to ten years after initial commissioning. While this promotion is 
based on an officer’s performance, the timing of their eligibility for the promotion is still 
largely independent of performance, despite some recent efforts by the Navy to make the 
timing more flexible (Chief of Naval Operations, 2015). 
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The Navy has already made efforts to make the ADHRB more efficient over the 
years. It recognized that offering one bonus to all aviators was a blunt instrument. In 
order to increase the bonus’ efficiency, they first divided it by pilot vs. NFO, and then 
further specified it by T/M/S. The essential next step that the Navy must take is 
specifying it by officer quality. As it stands now, the Navy does not distinguish between 
high-quality and low-quality officers when offering the bonus. Within the same 
designator (Pilot or NFO) and T/M/S, all aviators are offered the same bonus.  
In order to target the bonus to high-quality aviators we need to be able to tell 
which ones are high-type and which ones are low-type. The Navy must do this with 
limited information about the officer in question. An aviator NFO can be faced with a 
decision of whether or not to take the bonus after just two tours of duty. By the same 
token, the Navy must decide what bonus to offer that officer in the same short time 
frame. The first 2 to 3 years of an aviator’s career are spent in flight school, where 
observed FITREPs are not received. For NFOs, after that they have a squadron tour and a 
shore tour to prove themselves and for the Navy to decide their value. Pilots have one 
additional tour. While aviators receive FITREPs throughout their tours, it is widely 
recognized in aviation as well as other communities that the only FITREP that really 
matters is the last one in a tour before the check-out FITREP. This is the one that will 
give the final ranking of the officer against his or her peers in the unit. In practice, the 
aviation community seems to decide one way or another whether an officer will succeed 
or not based on the quality of a single FITREP; the final one of their first squadron tour. 
There is what is often referred to as the “golden path” of jobs that will lead to Department 
Head and command. There are only so many of these jobs so it becomes competitive to 
be assigned to them. Whether an aviator is put on this path to command is determined 
largely on the merit of the final FITREP from their first tour. If the Navy is to 
differentiate early on which officers deserve a higher bonus and which ones deserve a 
lower one then it must do so with very limited data points. That is, unless they can induce 
the individuals to separate themselves accordingly which is exactly what this proposed 
plan will do. 
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By increasing the efficiency with which we administer the bonus and by retaining 
better quality officers we can also increase the quantity that we retain. In a 2014 officer 
retention survey in which aviators were asked questions regarding why people stay in or 
leave the Navy, the author concluded that the three actionable areas in which the Navy 
could affect retention were pay, Navy culture, and operational tempo (OPTEMPO) 
(Snodgrass, 2014). With an effective restructuring of the ACCP bonus we can not only 
affect pay, but also Navy culture, a major part of which is leadership. We will increase 
pay for the highest performers and keep our best leaders. Better leadership will help 
retention in the future as many officers cite poor leadership and communication as a 
reason for their departure (Doyle & Patrissi, 2014). By not overpaying those who are low 
performers we can save money and apply it to keeping the high performers that we need 
while maintaining the correct quantity of aviators retained.  
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V. MENU OF CONTRACTS 
So how do we keep the best quality officers and keep the numbers that we need to 
fill billets while also maintaining a perception of fairness and parity? The answer lies in a 
menu of contracts. By allowing officers to choose their own bonus structure we will 
maintain a sense of fairness in the bonus payouts while inducing aviators, knowing their 
own type, and maximizing their own interests, to self-select themselves into categories of 
high-type and low-type. This will maximize the efficiency of the bonus for the Navy. 
A. PROPOSED BONUS PLAN 
I propose that the Navy offer two bonuses to its aviators to incentivize them to 
complete a Department Head tour, and another two bonuses to induce aviators to stay for 
command. One bonus will be a tier 2 bonus and will pay out annually an amount 75% of 
the current bonus. The bonus will become available six years after an aviator’s winging 
date for both pilots and NFOs, and payments will begin immediately upon contract 
acceptance. In return for the bonus, the aviator will be obligated to compete for, and if 
selected, to accept, orders as a Department Head. Payments will continue annually until 
the end of an aviator’s Department Head tour at which time the payments will stop and 
the aviator is free from contractual service obligations. The tier 2 bonus may be taken at 
any time after the six year mark and before the end of a DH tour, but the payments will 
stop at the end of the DH tour no matter when the bonus was taken. Should an aviator fail 
to screen for O4 or Department Head, payments will be stopped immediately. If a pilot 
chooses not to accept either of these bonuses, he or she remains obligated to complete the 
eight years of aviation service required of them from winging. If an NFO chooses not to 
accept this bonus, he or she will be free to transfer or separate as they see fit as their 
initial winging obligation is complete. 
The tier 1 bonus will initially pay out at one half the level of the tier 2 bonus. 
Upon selection to Department Head, the tier 1 bonus will pay out at levels significantly 
higher than the tier 2 bonus. Total payouts for a tier 1 bonus taker who accepts the bonus 
immediately and is selected for Department Head will be approximately 150% of the 
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current bonus, or double the tier 2 bonus. Those total payouts will be the same for all 
aviators who take the bonus immediately upon it being offered no matter when they are 
selected to Department Head. However, if they delay accepting the bonus they will forfeit 
the payment for each year they delayed. 
The major stipulation to these two bonus options is that an aviator must choose 
which bonus they would like to be offered at the end of their first squadron tour. Upon 
locking in which bonus they will be offered, they can choose whether to accept or reject 
that offer at the six-year mark after their winging. 
Since all Department Head contracts will terminate at the end of an aviator’s 
Department Head tour, it will lend itself to flowing right into a similar contract system for 
command. Again, two contracts will be offered at the end of an aviator’s Department 
Head tour. Tier 2 will be guaranteed immediate payments at 75% of the current command 
bonus and will obligate the aviator to compete for, and if selected to accept, orders for 
command of a squadron. Should an aviator fail to select for O5 or command, payments 
will stop. 
Like the tier 1 Department Head bonus, the tier 1 command bonus will payout at 
half the rate of the tier 2 bonus. Payments will begin immediately upon contract 
acceptance. Upon selection for command, the tier 1 bonus will increase payments for a 
total payout of double the tier 2 bonus. At the end of their command tour, bonus payouts 
will stop and aviators are free from contractual obligations.  
For both the ADHRB and ACRB, payments will be paused upon a single FOS. 
Should the aviator FOS a second time no more payments will be made. If the officer 
selects to the position in question on their second look then their payments will resume in 
addition to the missed payment. So, an officer selecting on their second look will be paid 
the same total amount as one selecting on their first look. 
B. PLAN BREAKDOWN  
This section will discuss the purpose of each element of the bonus plan and why it 
was included. 
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1. Early Selection of Bonus Option 
The selection by the bonus taker of their preferred bonus option early on is 
essential for the menu-of-contracts system to be effective. By selecting early, before they 
know the outcome of all their FITREPs and billet selection and all the other factors that 
contribute to being selected to Department Head, they indicate whether they expect to 
perform well or perform poorly. If the Navy were to wait and allow bonus takers to 
choose at a later point in their career, then the officer could look at his or her past 
performance and determine the chances of making Department Head and choose the 
bonus accordingly. This system incentivizes the tier 1 bonus takers to maximize their 
efforts to be selected to Department Head so that they receive the high payoff. It also 
alleviates the burden on the Navy to determine which aviators to offer the high bonus 
level and which to offer the low bonus level. The aviators will self-select into the 
appropriate category based on their expected ability to receive the payout. It does not pay 
for a low performer to choose the tier 1 bonus as he will only receive the lower payment 
levels before being screened out by O4 or Department Head selection boards. The low 
performer will choose the tier 2 bonus because it guarantees a higher level of payment 
before they are screened out. If they are a middle performer and not sure if they can be 
selected for Department Head, then they either are screened for Department Head and the 
Navy has received a discount and paid less money for a Department Head, or they do not 
make it and the Navy has paid less money to them before they are forced out. 
2. Six-Year Mark 
Under the old system the point at which an aviator can take the bonus is 
dependent on their ADSO date. Thus, it is significantly different for NFOs, who incur a 
six-year service obligation after winging, and pilots, who incur an eight-year obligation. 
The decision to make the contracts available at the six-year mark after an aviator’s 
winging for both pilots and NFOs was made for several reasons. First, this 6-year mark is 
the critical decision point for NFOs; it is when their ADSO runs out. This is usually 
where most aviators make the decision whether to stay in for a career or to get out of 
aviation. In 2000 the Navy learned the lesson that it needed to have the bonus available to 
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aviators when their ADSO runs out. That is why they changed the ACCP structure to 
ensure that it was available even if an officer was on a shore tour. So, the latest the Navy 
should have this bonus available is six years after winging. 
In order for the menu-of-contracts system to be effective, there must be some time 
separation between signing the contract and achieving the desired milestones that trigger 
the higher bonus payout. If the signing of the contract and the realization one way or 
another of whether those milestones have been met are too close in time, then it does not 
incentivize low-type individuals to select into the guaranteed lower bonus category. If 
they are expecting only one or even zero bonus payments to be half the size, then if they 
think they have even a small chance of making Department Head it pays for them to 
select the tier 1 bonus as the payout is much greater. 
We also cannot have the bonus offered too early because officers will be reluctant 
to sign up for a bonus obligating them to more service when they already have years left 
on their current service obligation. Circumstances can change in those years and they 
may be afraid of signing the contract and then a couple of years later, wanting to get out 
of the Navy. An explanation of how we incentivize pilots to do that follows. 
3. Stopping Payment after DH Tour 
By stopping payment and obligation after the Department Head tour, the Navy 
disincentivizes aviators from delaying accepting the bonus until they are certain of the 
outcome of their O4 and Department Head boards. Delaying the decision to take the 
bonus can only hurt the officer as they are missing out on potential payments. 
This element of the bonus also alleviates the concern that pilots will be hesitant to 
obligate themselves to more years of service when they still have another two more years 
of service obligation. Should pilots want to get out at the earliest off ramp then they need 
only reject the bonus and serve out their final two years before they can exit the service. 
If they are unsure of whether or not they want to get out, they can delay their decision to 
take the bonus until those two years have elapsed, but they are penalized because they 
will miss those bonus payments. In order for an aviator to receive the full bonus amount, 
they must accept the bonus at the earliest possible point.  
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Stopping payment of this bonus after the DH tour will also incentivize officers to 
take the command bonus so that they can continue at close to their current revenue 
stream. The danger is that officers will elect to depart the service after their DH tour since 
they are no longer obligated to serve longer. However, at this point the officer has put in 
over 14 years of service and it is expected that the draw of the retirement payout at 20 
years and the immediate command bonus opportunity will be enough to keep the officer 
in the service. Furthermore, under the new retirement plan, all officers are offered a 
bonus at 14 years of service, which obligates them to an additional four years. Combining 
this with the command bonus offers a large incentive to remain in the service. When the 
command and blended retirement bonus obligations expire officers are very close to the 
20-year mark and retirement so it is expected that they will stay until then. 
4. Continuous Offer versus One-Time Offer 
By offering the bonus at any time and not just at the six-year mark the Navy 
accomplishes several things. First, a pilot at the six-year mark may intend to get out once 
his or her obligation is complete, but have a change of mind over the subsequent two 
years. Alternatively, an officer may just be unsure of committing to the extra service 
obligation yet. By providing the option of taking the bonus at any time keeps an incentive 
in place for the officer as he or she makes the final decision.  
Second, the incentive to take the bonus immediately is already present, since the 
payments cut off at the end of the Department Head tour anyway. This means that in 
order to get all the payments, an officer must take the bonus immediately. By deferring 
the decision an officer only penalizes him or herself by missing payments (and saving the 
Navy money). In this way it cannot hurt the Navy to offer this, but only help. 
5. Payment Pause for One-Time FOS 
This bonus plan aims to limit the number and amount of payments to lower 
quality officers who do not select to Department Head or command. A single FOS is a 
good indicator that the aviator in question is a lower quality candidate. Should they 
ultimately be selected to the position, then they are paid the full amount of the bonus as if 
they had selected on the first look. However, by pausing the payment the Navy is able to 
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save that money should the aviator in question FOS a second time, which is quite 
common. 
C. EXPECTED EFFECTS  
1. Increased Retention of Highest Quality Aviators 
This bonus system offers the highest bonus payouts to the highest performers, 
while avoiding the perception that the Navy is acting inequitably. Officers choose the 
bonus plan that maximizes their own individual potential earnings. High performers 
know they are high performers and choose the tier 1 bonus, with the expectation that they 
will achieve the required milestones and receive a higher payout. Low performers will 
opt for the tier 2 bonus which allows them to receive guaranteed payments whether or not 
they select to Department Head. We need to ensure we are keeping our best personnel or 
we could see a similar spiral of poor leadership feeding into poor retention that the SWO 
community is reported to be troubled with. This bonus system is an effective way to 
separate the high performers from the low performers and offer the high performers the 
appropriate bonus. 
According to Kuhn and Yockey, the performance evaluation structure that best 
lends itself to a bonus system that offers a high-risk high-reward option and a low-risk 
low-reward option are those in which performance is evaluated individually (Kuhn & 
Yockey, 2003). This includes the Navy, where FITREPs, billet selection, all other 
measures of officer quality are based on individual performance. This means that an 
aviator’s fate, with regards to promotion and selection to Department Head, is in his or 
her own hands. This is what people want when they are faced with a decision of whether 
to take the non-guaranteed, performance-based compensation package or the guaranteed, 
lower level compensation. 
2. Increased Bonus Efficiency 
This bonus program will increase the efficiency with which we pay out bonus 
funds. By offering the appropriate bonus to each individual aviator, the Navy could see a 
cost savings in addition to increased retention of quality officers. Figure 4 shows a chart 
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of potential outcomes for an aviator faced with these decisions. The chart assumes that 
those who choose not to take any bonus do so because they intend to leave the aviation 
community, either by leaving the military entirely or by transferring to a different 
community. 
 
Figure 4.  Possible Bonus Outcomes 
As the chart shows, the main risk with this bonus system is that middle to high 
performers will choose the tier 2 bonus plan because they are not certain they can 
maintain a high level of performance. Then, when the time comes to decide whether to 
take the bonus or not, even if they have performed well and expect to be selected to 
Department Head, they may not choose to do so because the bonus level is lower. 
In every other potential outcome, the Navy benefits or breaks even. If high 
performers choose the tier 1 bonus, accept it, and are selected for Department Head, as 
they are expected to, then the Navy has successfully targeted the bulk of the bonus to the 
high performers. In this case the Navy has paid more, but has retained the highest quality 
aviator. Low performers are not expected to choose the tier 1 bonus, but if they do so and 
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accept it, then, unless their performance improves greatly, they will presumably not be 
selected for Department Head. If that is the case, then they will receive only the lowest 
payout before they are screened out by either the O4 or Department Head boards. This 
saves the Navy money by paying low performers the least. If aviators choose the tier 1 
bonus, thinking that they can perform well, but end up performing poorly, they may see 
that their chances of making Department Head are limited and instead choose to separate 
from the Navy or transfer communities. In this case the Navy has separated a low 
performer without having paid them any bonus. This also opens up the opportunity for 
that officer to transfer to a different community without waiting to be passed over once 
for O4, thereby potentially saving the Navy from separating an officer that may be more 
suited to a different community. 
Aviators selecting the tier 2 bonus are middle-to-low performers who are unsure 
of their ability to be selected to Department Head. Those that ultimately perform well and 
expect to select to Department Head may accept the bonus. Thus, the Navy has retained a 
high performer at 75% of the cost of the current system. If a low performer takes the tier 
2 bonus and does not expect to make Department Head he or she can still take the bonus 
as they could in the current system. Under this system though, the low performer will 
receive lower payments than are paid out at the current system before being screened out 
by O4 or Department Head boards. Again, another savings for the Navy. 
3. Lower Payouts to Low Performers 
Under the current system, NFO’s in particular, and pilots to a lesser degree, can 
take the bonus and receive large sums of the total bonus before being screened out by O4 
or Department Head boards. This system disincentivizes that behavior. Low performers 
who take either the tier 1 or tier 2 bonus and do not select to Department Head will 
receive less money annually than they would under the current system. On the other 
hand, low performing aviators that choose not to take the bonus, rid the aviation 
community of low performers sooner than if they waited for O4 or Department Head 
boards to screen them out. 
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4. Increased Motivation and Effort 
Under this new system the incentives for high performers will be significant. This 
will motivate those taking the tier 1 bonus to maintain a high level of performance 
throughout their careers. The payoffs for doing so and being selected to Department Head 
will be significant, and the penalty incurred for not being selected is equally substantial.  
Expended effort is something the Navy cannot observe and therefore cannot 
reward. Each officer makes a decision concerning the level of effort he or she will put in 
to being a top performer. The Navy has no way to observe the effort the officer expends, 
they can only observe result of that effort, the officer’s performance, and that may not 
become observable until well after the effort has been expended. For instance, the officer 
knows that they are putting in the effort necessary to have a good final FITREP when 
they eventually leave a command, but that FITREP will not occur and become observable 
to the Navy until much later. This bonus is intended to induce middle and low performers 
to become high performers through the investment of added effort. The rewards for such 
effort are significant, for both the Navy and the aviator. From the Navy’s standpoint, any 
tier 1 bonus taker is a net benefit. Those that select to Department Head are either 
naturally high performers who will have increased their effort in order to ensure 
selection, or middle or low performers who have invested their effort into becoming high 
performers. Even low performers who do not select to Department Head will presumably 
have still contributed more effort in his or her attempt to be selected, so the Navy still 
benefits. From the aviator’s standpoint, they hope to be rewarded with the higher bonus 
payout for their investment in added effort. 
5. Maintenance of Equity 
The element of choice is essential in maintaining the perception of equity among 
aviation officers. Each officer gets to choose his or her own bonus plan, one that best fits 
their skills and their intentions. This alleviates concerns that the Navy would be seen as 
treating anybody unfairly or favoring some aviators over others. Simultaneously, it 
relieves the Navy of the responsibility of deciding who should get what bonus. Many 
officers will also appreciate having their fates and compensation more in their own hands. 
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D. POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS 
1. Imperfect Promotion System 
The main problem that this new system could encounter is derived from an 
imperfect promotion system. The promotion rates and promotion numbers vary from year 
to year, sometimes intentionally and sometimes not (Osborn, 2015). There also remain 
countless anecdotal stories of the one person who did everything right and did not get 
selected versus the other who performed marginally and did get selected. The truth of 
these anecdotes is not as important as the perception they reinforce: that selection to O4 
and Department Head sometimes seems arbitrary. While this perception alone causes 
much frustration, it could be amplified significantly if individuals’ pay is directly affected 
by these perceived discrepancies. 
Beyond affecting morale after selection decisions have been made, the perception 
that chance plays a significant part in selection to Department Head could lead potential 
bonus takers to view the tier 1 bonus as too risky. In a survey obtained in personal 
correspondence with the Strategic Affairs Office of the Chief of Naval Personnel, of 
active duty respondents (officers and enlisted) across all communities, 64% of 
respondents said that timing played a bigger role on performance rankings than merit; 
only 6% said merit played a bigger role. Even if aviators believe that they can and will 
perform well, if they do not think that that performance will be rewarded with selection to 
Department Head, then they may not be willing to take the risk of taking the tier 1 bonus. 
Whereas the intent of the dual tier bonus system is to separate the best performers and 
target the larger bonus to them, if too much chance is involved in the decision, this could 
instead have the effect of separating the individuals with high risk tolerances from those 
with low risk tolerances.  
2. Not Targeting Undecided Bonus Takers 
This bonus system is designed to target the best performers. However, many times 
the best performers are such because they have a love for the Navy and intend to stay in 
no matter what. A risk of this bonus system is that it will funnel money to those who 
already intend to stay and not to those on the fence about staying or leaving. According to 
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a survey conducted as part of a 2014 Aviation Officer Retention Study, obtained in 
personal correspondence with the Strategic Affairs Office of the Chief of Naval 
Personnel, among the top three reasons people stay across all three ranks of LT, LCDR, 
and CDR were “patriotism,” and “loyalty to nation.” “Camaraderie” was also among the 
top three reasons for both LT and CDR with “benefits” taking the third biggest reason to 
stay in for LCDRs. With the exception of benefits for LCDRs, none of these retention 
factors are related to money. If money does not factor highly in aviators’ stay/leave 
decisions, then paying more may not have the desired effect. It is difficult to determine if 
we are currently keeping our best performers, much less whether or not this bonus would 
incentivize them to stay. The reason it is hard to determine if we are keeping our best 
performers is that the selection boards value both FITREP scores and which jobs are 
taken. A high performer may decide that he or she does not intend to stay and therefore 
decides to take a job that is more in line with personal interest than what the Navy wants. 
For instance, maybe they take a job in the pilot exchange program (PEP) because they 
want to travel overseas instead of taking the tour as a flight instructor at the Fleet 
Replenishment Group (FRG), a job the Navy values and rewards. Therefore, when the 
time for selection to O4 or Department Head arrives, although this pilot may be 
extremely capable, he or she may not appear so to the board and will not be selected. So a 
high performer may look like a low performer just because the officer decided that they 
are not planning to remain in aviation or in the Navy. Since the Navy has trouble telling 
whether it is keeping high performers or not, it becomes difficult to tell whether this new 
bonus would be able to effectively target those individuals. This could be mitigated by 
the increased effort the bonus system encourages. It will now be worth it for certain 
aviators to take the challenging orders and compete for Department Head versus the 
orders that align more with their own interests. 
3. Reinforcing “Golden Path” 
This also leads to another potential problem. The Navy has made efforts to get 
away from the “golden path” career progression (Kohlmann, 2015). They are trying to 
allow officers to advance while taking alternative career paths such as seeking graduate 
education or other non-standard tours. This emphasis on selection to Department Head, 
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added to the uncertainty involved in that selection, may make individuals hesitant to do 
anything that could jeopardize their chances of selecting to Department Head, such as 
taking alternative tours. It may make those jobs along the golden path even that much 
more competitive too. If more people are willing to take the tough jobs than there are jobs 
available, then things like timing of ones orders (luck) will end up playing a bigger part 
in getting those orders and subsequently in being selected to Department Head.  
4. Earlier Payment for Pilots 
Currently, NFOs can take their bonus five years after winging. This can be three 
years before an NFOs first look at O4, and if they are not selected in that board, it is an 
additional year before they are passed over again and separated. By this time they can be 
paid almost the entire bonus before they are screened out. We have mitigated this for 
NFOs by reducing the amount of those payments for both tier 1 and tier 2 bonus takers, 
by delaying the point at which they can take the bonus to six years, and by halting 
payment on one-time FOSs. However, we have created a similar situation for pilots, 
where they can be paid the bonus for an additional year before being separated. Whereas 
in the current system they cannot take the bonus until seven years of aviation service, 
under the proposed system they will be able to take it at six years. This is mitigated by 
the decrease of annual pre-FOS payments to NFOs as well as by lower payments to all 
aviators in this timeframe.  
5. Earlier ADSO for ACRB Takers 
The current ACRB obligates aviators to their 21st and 22nd years of service 
whereas the proposed system relieves aviators of that obligation at the end of their 
command tour, which is usually shortly before 20 years of service. The Navy can deem 
this an acceptable cost or it could mitigate by offering an additional bonus for the 21st and 
22nd years. As the new retirement plan becomes the mandatory plan, the Navy could also 
use the built-in mid-career bonus at 14 years to keep aviators in the service up to 18 




VI. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
In this study I incorporated research on signaling, separating equilibrium, moral 
hazard, adverse selection and other theoretical contract frameworks into the development 
of a retention bonus that meets the needs of the Navy aviation community and which fits 
into the current structure of an aviator’s career progression and utilizes career milestones 
already in place. The Navy has so far steadily specialized the ACCP to avoid the adverse 
selection problem of offering too much bonus to some and too little bonus to others. First 
it divided the bonus according to pilot vs NFO, and then further divided it according to T/
M/S. What it has thus far failed to do is divide the bonus according to performance. We 
currently offer too much bonus to low performers who are willing to stay and not enough 
bonus to keep high performers who have increased opportunities in other jobs and as such 
are more likely to leave. The menu-of-contracts system will ensure that we are paying 
sufficient bonus amounts to the highest quality aviators in order to induce them to stay 
while reducing excessive payments to low performers who have fewer opportunities for 
employment on the outside and thus need less incentive to remain in the Navy. The 
primary advantage of this system over the proposed auction system is that whereas the 
auction method targets those willing to stay in for the smallest bonus, a menu-of-
contracts specifically targets high quality individuals. The menu-of-contracts system 
would also fit well into the current promotion and advancement framework of aviation 
officers. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
One of the drawbacks of the menu-of-contracts system is that it relies on the 
Navy’s current promotion system which is imperfect. In order for the menu-of-contracts 
to be effective, officers must have faith that their hard work and superior performance 
will be rewarded with promotion and selection to Department Head and command. The 
more there is a perception that luck plays a large roll in promotion decisions the less 
effective the menu will be in separating high quality from low quality. Consequently, I 
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recommend that further research be put forth towards improving the FITREP and 
promotion systems to more accurately reflect the quality of a given officer. The better we 
can measure the quality of an officer, the easier it will be to target and retain the high 
quality aviators over the low quality aviators.  
Our greatest resource for solving the problems the Navy faces are the individuals 
facing those problems every day. The next step to implementing the menu-of-contracts 
system is to survey current and past aviators on the proposed system. Such a survey 
would help determine how many officers would be expected to choose each tier of the 
bonus, how such a choice might affect their stay/leave decisions as well as other career 
decisions. It could also open up a conversation within the community on how to fine tune 
its implementation to optimize keeping the right quality and quantity aviators while 
maintaining morale.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The menu-of-contracts system should be considered as a viable alternative to the 
current system or to the auction system that has been proposed to replace it. The menu-
of-contracts can meet the retention needs of the Navy while increasing the efficiency with 
which the bonus is administered. This will lead to retention of higher quality aviators 
which will in turn increase morale leading to better retention in the future as well. It will 
also induce maximum effort for aviators throughout their careers as they strive for the 
highest possible bonus. The menu-of-contracts does all of this while maintaining the 
perception of egalitarianism and remaining within the current aviator career timeline and 





Table 4.   Uniform-Price Auction Example. Source: Kelso (2014). 
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